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When Managers Make Irrational Contingency Planning Decisions
Stephen E. Lunce, Texas A&M International University, slunce@tamiu.edu
Abstract
Organizations depend upon their strategic systems for
both survival and success in the competitive environments
of today. In this environment exist threats to the security of
these vital systems; these include, but are not limited to:
natural disasters (e.g. floods and hurricanes), sabotage (e.g.,
hackers and disgruntled employees), and human error (e.g.
the “Y2K bug”). This paper reviews some relevant
management issues involved in the recognition of the
existence of a threat and the reactions that organizations can
take in response to this recognition.
Introduction
In the information age, systems have become
increasingly important to the survival and success of
organizations as they become more reliant upon information
as both a product and source of intelligence about the
environment in which they exist. The environment is not
benign, and as many researchers have demonstrated, threats
from the environment continue to place information systems
at risk (Aasgaard, et al, Christensen and Schkade, Lunce,
and Subhani). When these threats are actualized as hazards
the security of the information system is likely to be
compromised.
Organizational success is relative to the consequences
of the decisions made by the managers within the
organization. It has been stated that  “all managerial
activities revolve around decision making. The manager is
first and foremost a decision maker” (Turban, p. 4). The
decision maker must be aware that a threat to the security of
the organization's information system exists in the
environment. However, awareness alone is not a sufficient
motivation for action for most decision makers. In a
threatening situation there are some general principles which
may be applied; these principles are: threat evaluation,
response identification, and cost benefit determination
(Christensen and Schkade).
The Irrational Decision
A manager who is aware of the threat has developed a
perceptual awareness. With this perception, the decision
maker can begin to execute the managerial responsibilities
of protecting and preserving the organizations assets. If the
threat has been identified and the manager determines that
a significant threat exists, the action must be taken to protect
the system that is at risk. Failure to take protective action
will either violate legislative requirements, such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or will provide evidence that
the decision maker does not regard the threat as serious
enough to merit preemptive action.
The premise that threats exist for systems in general is
universally accepted, and these threats to the security of
systems have been demonstrated to be isomorphic across
systems (Christensen). The issue that this acceptance
presents is, if threats are real, and if threats are perceived by
decision makers,  how does this perception effect the way in
which decision makers go about their decision making
process in relation to the potential development of disaster
recovery plans. How the organization responds to these
threats is a reflection of the decision maker's perception of
the significance of the threat. If the decision maker perceives
a serious risk, one that if incurred would result in significant
damage to the organization, some action will be initiated by
the perception. There will be evidence of this perception in
a specific subset of the security measures implemented by
the organization. That subset is the organization's
contingency plan (Lunce).
Systems, including business systems, exist in a causal
environment. The activities of nature impact nature itself
and the artificial systems that reside within the natural
environment. Everything that is exist in some way a result of
some precedent cause. The causes exist a priori and their
existence is evidenced by their results. These causes might
be described as action motivators, i.e. through their
existence or occurrence, a resultant action is taken or a new
state of being is achieved. Similarly, in the business world,
situations are the result of a priori causes. Some of those
causes may result in damage or harm to the organization. If
an antecedent event may damage an organization, it can
properly be referred to as a threat. The creation of source
code that is unable to adequately manipulate dates greater
than 1999 is an example of an a priori cause that resulted in
a serious threat to organizational survival, i.e., the Y2K bug.
A rational manager will always seek to maximize
profitability, or to minimize costs; the actualization of an
unmitigated risk would be evidence of an irrational decision.
Threats might appear in one of two forms. They will
either be natural events that might impact the organization,
or they will be the result of some human activity. For
example, storms such as hurricanes and tornadoes would be
included in the category of natural threats. Deliberate or
accidental destruction or corruption of a database would be
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considered within the category of the man made threats. The
Y2K problem falls into this later category, and it resulted
from a supposedly rational a priori decision to save space in
computer storage devices.
If threats do exist, why do organizations at the direction
of their management team respond differently to the
existence of events that might damage that organization?
The answer seems to reside within the perceptions and risk
acceptance behaviors of the managers responsible for
organizations. The severity of the threat, and the probability
of its occurrence with detrimental impact upon the
organization is a perceptual idea that will vary from decision
maker to decision maker. This variance in perception is
analogous to two individuals observing the same art work,
and one of the individuals appreciating the work while the
other is not impressed. Decision makers' views or
perceptions of the significance of the threat, i.e. the amount
of risk to which the organization is exposed, varies from
individual to individual. Humans will look at the same
situation, regardless of its nature, and the perspectives will
vary from individual to individual. The model reflects this
variability.
If a decision maker perceives within a situation a large
enough risk, the decision maker will take steps to mitigate
the risk. For example, if the risk is fire (a causality loss that
may occur), the decision maker may purchase an insurance
policy in order to protect the property from potential loss.
Acquiring causality insurance is common in many areas of
resource management. However, information systems are a
relatively new component in the organizational structure.
Their importance as a resource has been established, but the
method best suited to placing a dollar value on these
resources are still being debated. Without a concrete starting
point, it is difficult for management to justify expenditures
for the insurance protection of a resource, unless the
potential threats can be mentally justified as actually serious
and significant. This justification is based upon the decision
maker's perception of the severity of the risk. The greater the
perceived severity, the more likely the decision maker is to
take action to preserve the resource that is at risk, assuming
that the value of the resource has been established.
A Case Study of a Successful Plan
First Interstate Bank is an international financial
institution. "At 10:30 p.m. the night of May 4, 1988, Los
Angeles' worst high-rise fire swept through the 62 story
downtown headquarters of First Interstate Bank destroying
floors 12 through 16" (Coleman, p. 5). Forty percent of the
fire companies of Los Angeles responded to the fire. The
fire was suppressed by 3:00 a.m. 5 May, a normal work day
in the banking industry.
The risk, or that event that caused the damage, was a
fire. Risks are threats that have been actualized (i.e. they
result in losses, which may be either physical or financial or
a combination of both). The threat in this case was never
publicly identified; however, a faulty electrical system has
been suspected. The effects of the this disaster were
widespread. The Securities Trading Department, located on
the twelfth floor, was totally destroyed. This department
typically processed three to five billion ($3,000,000,000 -
$5,000,000,000) in transactions every day. Temperatures in
the fire exceeded 2,000o Fahrenheit; the mini and micro
computers in the bond trading department failed to
withstand the heat. Although the fire was contained above
the twelfth floor, the eleventh floor, which contained First
Interstate's security vault and its paper archives, was totally
destroyed by water from the fire containment efforts. Not
only were major data processing facilities destroyed,
approximately 2,000 employees were displaced.
The management of First Interstate Bank was mandated
to have a contingency plan in place by regulations such as
Banking Circular BC-177; however, they were committed to
insuring that their plan was both current, well tested, and
functional. At 11:00 p.m. bank management declared an
emergency which activated the contingency plan. The
emergency operations center (E.O.C.) was activated. The
E.O.C. is a remote site that had been equipped with
computers, software, and archival data that would allow the
bank to quickly recover critical (but not all) functions.
Within twenty-four (24) hours all key units were functional,
although some of the traders had to utilize portable lap-top
computers and access the bank's files via modems. To the
external environment serviced by First Interstate, the next
day (May 5th) appeared to be business as usual, even though
banking could not take place in the Bank's high-rise
building. The main branch reopened two days after the fire
in leased offices. With A.T.& T.'s help, phone service was
restored to some 3,000 phone numbers by the morning of 7
May, only seventy-two hours after the fire. The disaster had
virtually no effect on the 1988 profitability of the bank.
Strategic Implications of Contingency Plans
Information has value to organizations in both strategic
planning and tactical operations (Frenzel). That valuable
information is provided by the organization's information
systems. Threats exist in the environment wherein the
organization resides. If these threats are actualized, the
system which provides information may be damaged or
destroyed. If the existence of the threats is recognized, and
if any threat is perceived as large enough to adversely effect
the operations of the organization, then the rational decision
maker who perceives the threat will be motivated to take
action to protect the information providing resource. The
first action is the development of a plan to deal with the
threat should it occur. This is a contingency plan, and this
plan comes into existence as a direct result of a decision
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maker's perception of a potential loss, and as insurance
against that potential loss.
Threats to Information Systems: A Risk Matrix
IMPACT ON THE FIRM
Mission
 Failure _
Business
Interruption _
Business
Disruption _
Little or
None _
Duration
of Outage
Moment < 48
Hrs.
2-14
Days
> 14
Days
Figure 1: A Risk Matrix (after Toigo)
The perceived size of the potential loss is reflected in
the sophistication of the contingency plan and the quality of
the exercise of the plan, as the model illustrates. The greater
the possible loss, the more sophisticated will be the steps
taken by the rational decision maker to insure that if the
threat is actualized, the damage has been mitigated. The
more of the plan that can be practiced the more employee
familiarity will be developed. As familiarity increases, the
possibility of unforeseen occurrences in the actual execution
of the plan will decrease. A plan that is very sophisticated
may not be as effective a recovery tool as a less
sophisticated plan that has been well rehearsed. If personnel
know how to respond and know precisely who is responsible
for which activities, the recovery window will be reduced.
This reduction may mean the difference in survival of the
organization at a level that resembles the pre-actualization
of the threat, and the failure of the organization to survive
for an extended period of time in the post-incident
environment (Christensen and Schkade).
It has been demonstrated that the existence of the
contingency plan is a function of the perception of rational
decision makers (Lunce), but several other issues must be
addressed. Prior research has indicated that the determining
factor in the cash outlay for the development of a
contingency plan is the time criticality of recovery. If the
time between failure and recovery is insignificant, then the
amounts budgeted to recovery plans should be expected to
be less than if the time to recovery is critical to the
functionality of the organization (Subhani). If perception is
the motivator, and if time is the critical dimension, then the
awareness of the existence of a previously unperceived
threat should motivate decision makers toward either
creation of new plans or exercise and possible revision of
existing plans. Unfortunately, not all decision makers choose
to the respond to there perceptions of the existence of real
threats to the organization.
Concluding Remarks
Organizations could be categorized along several
dimensions in order to better understand the nature of their
contingency planning. This understanding could provide
insights into how decision makers think and how they
actually perceive the existence of real threats within the
environment. These insights may help future decision
makers  increase the effectiveness with which they are able
to manage their information resources. Analysis of the
insights gained may demonstrate a  need to devote time and
effort to a specific class of planning aids to support decision
makers who have perceived that a significant risk exists and
have decided to act upon that perception.
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